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The imperfections 
of the capital 
market 
Eduardo Sarmiento P.* 
T h e classical theory of capital is based on an ideal 
functioning of markets and assumes that economies 
have a great capacity for adjustment, goods being eas-
ily substitutable, supplies relatively elastic, prices flex-
ible and markets composed of a large number of in-
d iv idua l s . Neve r the l e s s , most underdeve loped 
economies exhibit traits far removed from such 
assumptions. Are these traits important enough to 
modify the results of the classical model and explain 
the imperfections of the capital market? The author 
answers this question on the basis of a number of cen-
tral concepts and the experience of the Colombian 
economy. 
T h e article consists of four parts. Part i identifies 
some outstanding elements which have not been ex-
plicitly incorporated into the analysis of the capital 
market . A detailed analysis is given of the com-
plementari ty between credit and the demand for 
goods, the supply of physical goods, the monopoly 
power of agents and the predominance of adaptive 
expectations. As these phenomena are irregular, their 
repercussions on the capital market cannot be an-
alysed with traditional techniques. A large part of the 
section is devoted to an outline of a number of con-
cepts and tools for dealing with this type of problem. 
In part n the effects of the liberalization of the 
capital markets are examined, while part in discusses 
how far the information given in part n corroborates 
the assumptions of the capital market behaviour pre-
sented in part i. In addition, these elements are an-
alysed simultaneously in order to synthesize the causes 
of the imperfections in the capital market and their 
relation to financial liberalization. 
T h e final part outlines the features of the financial 
reforms required to achieve the reconciliation of effi-
ciency with stability. 
•Staff member of the Economic Development Division of 
I 
Basic concepts 
1. Credit and durable goods 
Some empirical studies suggest that the effects of 
credit vary with the characteristics of the goods. 
The evidence is particularly clear in the case of 
durable and non-durable goods, and agrees with 
the theory that distinguishes between flows and 
stocks. In general, it is recognized that flows are 
related to income and stocks to wealth and that 
each depends in the short run on different ele-
ments. The fluctuations of credit initially affect 
stocks and wealth and only later have an in-
fluence on durable goods. The processes asso-
ciated with the two types of goods may fluctuate 
in the short term, interfering with the adjust-
ment process. 
These concepts can be illustrated by the 
identity: W + C = PK + PD + F. In which W = 
wealth, C = credit, K ~ capital goods, D = du-
rable goods, PK and PD = the prices of capital 
goods and of durable consumer goods and F = 
financial assets. 
According to this identity the sum of wealth 
and credit is equal to the total of physical and 
financial assets. If credit increases and produc-
tion does not vary, the prices of durable invest-
ment and consumer goods will rise1. The funds, 
after passing through the sellers of the goods, 
would return to the financial market in the form 
of financial assets, or would be employed to ac-
quire physical assets. The effective wealth of the 
economy would be greater than the desired 
wealth. Equality would only be reached through 
a rise in the level of prices or a reduction of 
credit. This relationship also holds in the op-
posite direction. The rise in the prices of assets 
can only be made effective when the desired 
wealth is augmented or the credit expanded. 
Thus the demand for credit increases in the same 
direction as the prices of the assets. 
' The final impact of credit depends on the conditions of 
supply, which are not easily generalized. The adjustment 
process described in this section applies mainly to durable 
goods with an inelastic supply, such as assets which require a 
long production period: housing and investments subject to 
large indivisibilities such as those pertaining to large enter-
prises. 
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The expansion of credit, therefore, gener-
ates a rise in the prices of physical assets and then 
an expansion of financial assets. Both factors, 
taken together, determine an increase in the 
effective wealth of the economy in relation to the 
desired wealth. Individuals would respond to 
this situation by replacing physical assets by non-
durable consumer goods, which would result in a 
rise in the general level of prices. The new 
equilibrium would be attained at the point where 
relative prices returned to their initial level. 
This adjustment does not occur when the 
prices of non-durable goods are subject to con-
trols, or are determined by external prices in an 
open economy. The correction of the imbalance 
would occur only ifthe prices ofassets fell to their 
previous initial level and met the resistance of the 
owners. These would try to retain their holdings 
and would press for the maintenance of the ini-
tial increase in credit. Hence a widespread 
tendency to avoid the liquidation of assets at a 
lower price might be manifested in a high de-
mand for credit, which would prevent a fall in 
interest rates. 
It is usually assumed that the prices ofassets 
are determined in a system in which all supplies 
and demands are satisfied. But in the real world 
economic agents have no data to let them know 
when a situation of this kind is reached. Thus in 
capital markets, which are exposed to serious 
imperfections, the prices obtained do not always 
reflect what is happening with actual transac-
tions. In these markets it is common to find prices 
incorrectly set above market clearing levels, thus 
leading to lower sales. Such a possibility is quite 
possible if expectations are adaptive, where in-
dividuals fix their prices in accordance with past 
rather than current experience, so that prices 
remain higher than those which satisfy the 
wealth equation. It would be a typical situation in 
which the wealth obtained by individuals would 
be greater than the effective wealth. The attempt 
of individuals to maintain these prices would cre-
ate a demand for credit higher than that which 
provoked the initial slack. Interest rates would be 
determined, therefore, by the structure of ex-
pectations of unreal prices which could place 
them at any level. 
It is clear that physical assets and credit are 
closely interrelated; that is, they are com-
plementary goods. Although this fact is not 
CEPAL REVIEW No. 27 / December 1985 
openly rejected, it is not always recognized in 
practice. The influence of the neoclassical theory 
has led to the belief that all goods are substitut-
able. In these conditions the fluctuations of a 
market, although they may affect other markets, 
do not change its basic features. Formulations in 
which supply, demand and the interest rate of 
the financial market are independent of the rest 
of the economic system may be justified at times, 
but this simplification is mistaken when the 
goods are complementary. In this case the alter-
ation of a market can destabilize other markets 
which operate satisfactorily by themselves. Thus, 
in the adjustment described, it is clear that credit 
affects the processes ofassets and these affect the 
interest rates. This linkage between the credit 
market and the market for physical assets plays a 
central role in the interpretation of real phe-
nomena. Further on it will be shown that many 
events that take place in the credit market origi-
nate in the market for physical assets, and vice-
versa. 
2. Liquidity and indivisibility 
The possibility of acquiring a good and then sell-
ing it at another price is limited by the resources 
necessary to effect the transfer. Hence liquidity 
appears as one of the main requisites for carrying 
out any speculative operation and is clearly re-
lated to the characteristics of the goods. If these 
were perfectly divisible, speculative options 
would be scarce. Everyone could take part in 
them in accordance with their possibilities, as 
happens in the market of goods and services. 
The expected value of the speculative gains 
would correspond in the long run to the normal 
profitability of capital. Naturally, the greater the 
indivisibility of the goods, the smaller the num-
ber of individuals who can operate in these mar-
kets. The assumption of competition among spec-
ulators thus becomes invalid. Speculation in 
large-scale goods markets confers obvious 
monopoly powers on those who have access to 
liquidity. This is confirmed by the behaviour of 
economic groups in the transactions of large en-
terprises. Their technique consists in precipitat-
ing price movements to obtain enormous gains in 
buying and selling operations. 
The Keynesian concept of speculation is 
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based on the maintenance of liquid resources by 
individuals in the expectation of opportunities 
which will give them a profit in the buying and 
selling of products. Large-scale indivisibilities 
modify this idea in the sense that liquidity is not 
only required to take advantage of the buying 
and selling opportunity, which is in a way 
fortuitous, but also to acquire a good to which 
others have no access. The gain does not derive 
so much from taking advantage of an immediate 
operation but rather from the administration of 
the activity by those who have the liquidity. The 
advantage comes from the profit resulting from 
obtaining existing enterprises at low cost. 
Here it is important to distinguish between 
ownership without control and ownership with 
control: the former relates to small shareholders 
and the latter to the economic agents who 
administer and direct the enterprises. While the 
attitude of the former is influenced by short-
term elements, that of the latter is determined by 
the possibilities of the enterprises and the effects 
on other.activities. In this context, there is no 
validity in the hypothesis that large enterprises 
become divisible in the stock markets. Ownership 
with control is indivisible in the sense that the 
power to influence the decisions of enterprises is 
only attained with a certain minimum participa-
tion in the ownership of the assets. 
In the standard formulations of economic 
theory it is generally assumed that the holding of 
goods and liquidity are substitutable. Individuals 
can increase their possession and consumption of 
goods to the extent that they sacrifice liquidity. 
The foregoing propositions constitute and argu-
ment against this hypothesis. Some goods tend to 
be complementary to liquidity and the ratio be-
comes narrower in proportion to their indivisi-
bility. Their demand tends to be restricted by 
elements of a quantitative nature. Liquidity, 
therefore , introduces a constraint in the 
functioning of economies which prevents in-
dividuals from achieving their desired ends. 
In economic theory it is generally assumed 
that the distortions that obstruct the automatic 
adjustment of markets occur in isolation and in 
very small amounts. However, this interpretation 
cannot easily be extended to the case of liquidity, 
which affects a wide variety of economic agents 
and of goods. The limitation imposed by the size 
of the goods results in a demand much smaller 
than the economic agents' desire: a factor which 
has serious repercussions on the whole economic 
system. 
Experience shows that the development of 
large enterprises takes a number of years. Their 
supply is inelastic in the medium term. Hence 
greater demand to acquire them is manifest at 
the outset in a rise in prices. As this effect is of 
short duration, the volume of these enterprises 
remains unchanged. The adjustment will be 
made mainly through the channel of quantities. 
The higher relative price of these assets creates 
an increase in wealth, which stimulates an expan-
sion of expenditure and a rise in the general level 
of prices. Thus the initial rise in the prices of 
assets and the expansion of the nominal amount 
of money neutralize each other. The relative 
prices and the real quantity of money tend to 
return to the initial situation. Hence an obvious 
vicious circle is formed. Production does not ex-
pand because the rise in prices is temporary, and 
this rise is temporary because production does 
not expand. 
3. Substitution between 
financial and physical assets 
and the stock market 
Substitution between physical and financial 
assets has been the subject of a long debate 
(McKinnon, 1973; Levhary and Patink, 1968). 
Sarmiento (1984a, chapter vi) shows that it does 
not happen in global terms. The shift of wealth 
into financial assets results from an expansion of 
credit which enables the same volume of physical 
assets to be maintained with a smaller number of 
owners. The relation is of interest when it occurs 
between financial assets and entrepreneurial 
capital and depends on the method of channell-
ing the credit generated in the expansion of 
financial resources. If this is used to finance the 
purchase of durable goods or to maintaining spec-
ulative balances, the two assets will appear as 
substitutes. 
These concepts acquire more theoretical sig-
nificance and more practical utility when they 
refer to specific economic agents. Thus tbe sub-
stitution between financial assets and entre-
preneurial capital is very different for ordinary 
shareholders and for those who control the en-
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terprises. It can be presumed that the former are 
willing to sell their shares for financial assets if 
they will thereby obtain more profit. In contrast, 
the profitability ofthe controlling shareholders is 
determined by the long-term prospects of the 
enterprises, which cannot readily be replaced by 
momentary financial returns. Besides, we have 
seen that the exercise of entrepreneurial control 
is contingent on liquidity. The buyer of an enter-
prise should be in a position not only to make a 
transfer of wealth, but also to maintain credit to 
cover the greater part ofthe assets. Consequently, 
the physical assets of the ordinary shareholders 
are highly substitutable with financial assets, 
whereas those ofthe controlling shareholders are 
relatively complementary. 
The link between the financial market and 
the stock market is clearly seen in this context. 
Let us suppose that the interest rate of financial 
securities rises through the application of admin-
istrative or market mechanisms. The ordinary 
shareholders would shift towards the financial 
assets and the expansion of these would be re-
flected in an expansion of credit. There is no 
mechanism, however, to guarantee the channell-
ing of these credit resources into the enterprises 
which have suffered a reduction in their ordi-
nary shareholders. It all depends on the behaviour 
of capital markets. If the enterprises manage to 
attract the credit generated by the shift of their 
ordinary shareholders, a situation would arise in 
which the liabilities would be represented in a 
greater proportion by credit and in a lesser pro-
portion by paid-up capital. In general terms, 
there would be an expansion of bonds and credit, 
a reduction in the number of shareholders in the 
enterprises and a strengthening of the economic 
power of the controlling shareholders. 
The different motivations of the ordinary 
shareholders and the controlling shareholders 
have had a decisive influence on the conduct of 
the stock market and the financial market. Many 
ofthe defects observed in recent years originated 
in a failure to grasp this fact. The hypothesis that 
the two types of shareholders behave in the same 
way led to the assumption that the expansion of 
financial saving derived from a net increase in 
saving and that the weakening of the stock mar-
ket was neutral as regards investment and 
economic power. These attitudes had a decisive 
influence on the passive position of the gov-
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ernments in face of the strange phenomena tak-
ing place in the financial sector. 
The evolution of the stock exchange in the 
last 25 years in Colombia provides valuable in-
formation on these behaviour patterns and 
empirical proof of some of the hypotheses. The 
figures are based on a survey of 30 enterprises 
carried out by the Comisión de Valores and pub-
lished in a study by J.C. Restrepo and others 
(1983). The basic findings of the survey are 
summarized in tables 1 and 2. 
In the appendix an approximate expression 
ofthe profitability of shares is worked out. If this 
profitability is equal to the interest rate of a finan-
cial security with the same risk, the financial mar-
ket and the stock market will be related in con-
ditions of equilibrium by the following equation: 
r = _ B _ ± D* _ P* 
Pa + D ~P~" 
where D = dividend, Pa = price of the share, 
P = level of prices, - ^ - — rate of variation of 
the level of prices, ^- = rate of exchange of the 
dividends and r = real interest rate. 
The information on dividends and inflation 
given in table 2 was introduced into this equation 
to estimate the equivalent interest rate of the 
shares. The results of this exercise are summa-
rized in table 3. 
Tables 1 and 2 show respectively that the 
levels of participation of the paid-up capital of 
enterprises and the price of shares have been 
declining in the last twenty years. The trend has 
not been very even, however. The prices fall in 
some periods and rise less markedly in others. 
Similarly, it will be seen that the behaviour pat-
tern differs in the two decades. 
In the 1960s two periods can be dis-
tinguished. In the first (1960-1966) share prices 
went down, whereas in the second (1967-1970) 
they went up in real terms. In the last period the 
returns were higher and in most years grew at a 
higher rate than inflation. Thus the expected 
profitability was 4% in the period 1960-1966 and 
11% in the period 1967-1970. The close relation-
ship between real prices and returns shows that 
the stock market is highly sensitive to short-
term returns. Undoubtedly this was influenced 
Table 1 
COLOMBIA: FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES, 1960-1981 
(Percentages) 
I. Assets 
Cash in hand 
Debtors: 






I I . Liabilities 
Creditors: 
Short term 



















































































































































































































































































































































































Source: ABC; (1973); Pieschacón (1982). Calculations of the Comisión Nacional de Valores (National Securities Commission). Market Development Division. 
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Table 2 
COLOMBIA: DIVIDENDS, 
PRICES AND EXPECTED PROFITABILITY 
OF INDUSTRIAL SHARES, 1960 TO 1982 
(Percentages) 
in the interest rate of financial securities that 
occurred during that period created a competi-
tion that impelled the agents to demand higher 
returns in order to maintain the shares. 


























































































Source: Restrepo and others (1983). 
by economic agents for whom stocks and finan-
cial instruments were highly substitutable. 
The trend is less clear in the 1970s. The 
spectacular fall of real prices between 1970 and 
1975 cannot be attributed to the expected prof-
itability, the values of which in that period were 
not very different from those of the period 1966-
1970. The same may be said of the price recovery 
that occurred in 1976-1979, when profitability 
was also very similar to that of the preceding 
years. All this suggests that the behaviour of the 
stock market during the 1970s cannot readily be 
attributed to conjunctural factors. The explana-
tion must be sought in the structural changes of 
this market and in exogenous factors. 
In table 3 it will be seen that the expected 
profitability was much higher in the 1970s than 
in the preceding decade. This is clearly related to 
the transformation of the capital market which 
took place in the course of that decade. The rise 
Table 3 
COLOMBIA: 
EQUIVALENT INTEREST RATES AND REAL PRICES, 
1962-1966 TO 1980-1982 
(Percentages) 
Period Annual equivalent 
interest rate 
Average variation 

















Source: Calculations of the author. 
The alterations observed during 1970-1980 
reflect many of the phenomena accumulated 
during that period of transition. The continuing 
fall in prices and the shifts of ordinary sharehold-
ers to the financial market brought with them a 
reduction in the number of owners and in the 
percentage of paid-up capital in the assets of 
enterprises. The control of these could be 
obtained with less wealth and always redounded in 
more profit. Thus the market came to be in-
creasingly influenced by the shareholders with 
power, and the substitution between shares and 
other financial assets was gradually reduced. The 
close relationship between prices and returns 
observed during the 1960s came to an end. 
Hence the rise in prices between 1976and 1979 is 
not explained by a better return but by the com-
petition between different agents to obtain con-
trol of enterprises. Consequently the variations 
in prices increased and were unrelated to the 
short-term profitability of financial assets. 
The systematic weakening of the stock mar-
ket cannot be attributed to inevitable structural 
causes. The high substitution between physical 
and financial assets for the ordinary sharehold-
ers and the low substitution for the controlling 
shareholders is probably the only factor that can 
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be regarded as inherent in the functioning of the 
economic system, but its presence alone could 
not generate the transformation. The fall in 
prices, the shift of the ordinary shareholders to-
wards the financial market and the concentration 
of ownership are connected with a series of ele-
ments whose emergence and reinforcement can 
be identified through the course of the two de-
cades. In the 1960s they are explained by the low 
returns on shares and in the following decade by 
the rise in the interest rate and the growing pow-
er of economic groups. 
None of this was inevitable. The low returns 
of the 1960s could have been counteracted by a 
more open policy of profit distribution. The rise 
in the interest rate, caused by the same economic 
policy, could have been avoided by administra-
tive measures. What is certainly true is that the 
enormous power of the groups was very difficult 
to counter at the end of the 1970s without pro-
voking critical states of crisis. It is also true, 
however, that this situation would not have 
occurred had it not been for the conditions that 
facilitated the transformation that ended in the 
heavy concentration of economic power. 
Another factor that has affected the stock 
market is tax legislation. The régime in force in 
recent years includes regulations of different 
types that discriminate against shares. The most 
important of these is that which authorizes enter-
prises to include interest payments as costs. As 
these payments have a high component of infla-
tion, which corresponds rather to appreciation of 
liabilities, credit brings with it a substantial sub-
sidy which increases with inflation and conceals 
real profits. This structure stimulates the 
replacement of shares by credit, facilitates an 
entrepreneurial management which aims at dis-
tributing only a small fraction of the profits, and 
has created a highly inequitable taxation system. 
These results have practical and theoretical 
repercussions. There is no doubt that the 
economic groups possess monopoly powers 
which affect share prices. Thus, the policy of 
increasing nominal dividends at a lower rate than 
inflation impelled individuals to sell their shares, 
thereby provoking a fall in their prices, of course 
this behaviour was also encouraged by the rise in 
the interest rate of financial securities and by the 
lack of effective regulations. 
4. The economic groups 
Together with the rise of capitalism, large firms 
have come into being which require substantial 
financial resources for their creation and main-
tenance. This is a result of the general proposi-
tion that mass production can be carried out 
more favourably in large enterprises. The char-
acteristics of the process have varied, however, 
from one place to another. Industrialization in 
England went ahead through a system of largely 
self-financed investments. In Germany, howev-
er, it was based on a close relationship between 
the banks and industrial firms. On the other 
hand, the rapid growth of the United States at 
the end of nineteenth century coincided with the 
emergence of large firms and cartels which led to 
a high concentration of ownership. 
The industrial and financial growth of Latin 
America in recent decades has been associated 
with the so-called economic groups or con-
glomerates. These groups have something of the 
German and of the United States model. They 
consist of individuals who frequently have some 
family link and profess a strong loyalty to the 
organization. They tend to operate in the finan-
cial sector and in the industrial sector and gener-
ally seek to expand into a great variety of activi-
ties. The common aim is to obtain the greatest 
benefits for the organization, which in some cases 
may mean losses in certain activities in order to 
favour others. 
The most outstanding feature of the 
economic groups is undoubtedly their enormous 
propensity for taking risks. Many of the financial 
phenomena that have occurred in recent years 
both in the economic and institutional sphere 
are the result of this attitude. Nevertheless, the 
current explanation that the groups are in a bet-
ter position to diversify risks by acting in dif-
ferent activities is not sufficiently convincing. 
There are undoubtedly much more cogent 
reasons. 
The chief of these has to do with the nature 
of the activities of the groups. Some have prop-
erties which are public goods and generate ex-
ternalities for other activities. The best example 
is that of the financial institutions, whose failings 
cause losses of confidence that work against the 
stability of the financial system and that of the 
whole economy. Something similar occurs with 
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the large industrial firms, whose health is often 
regarded as an indicator of the state of the whole 
sector and as a responsibility of government. 
Their paralysis is reflected in sharp falls in 
employment, since the machines cannot be 
moved to other activities, and is often forestalled 
by government subsidies, which tend to corre-
spond to only a small fraction of the fixed costs. In 
the short term the economic and, of course, the 
public costs of maintaining them in operation 
always seem too small to justify their closure. 
Hence in practice no government allows the 
bankruptcy of large enterprises during its term 
of office. 
Moreover, the groups are so organized that 
the finances of the different activities are in-
dependent. This is why it is common practice to 
register the enterprises in the name of different 
persons and to generate losses in some activities 
in order to make profits in others. Naturally, the 
simultaneous action of the groups in activities of 
d i f f e ren t types which have no solidary 
responsibility leads to forms of conduct out of 
keeping with the traditional concepts. 
This institutional framework has conferred 
on the groups of power of administering a public 
good. They are in a position to take possession of 
the benefits of activities which affect a large part 
of the population. Naturally their aim is to seize 
and concentrate the profits of the good periods 
in the hands of the owners of the groups and to 
transfer the losses of the bad periods to the gov-
ernment and to shareholders who do not belong 
to the organization. 
The best example of this is found in the 
economic crisis of recent years. The groups took 
action to obtain government subsidies to avoid 
bankruptcies among the large enterprises. The 
economic boom of the late 1970s ended in far-
reaching State intervention in the principal 
banks and in the large enterprises to avoid their 
disappearance. 
No less indicative has been the action of the 
groups to the detriment of the shareholders who 
do not belong to them. We saw earlier that the 
economic groups are in a position to distribute 
the profits which go specifically to the ordinary 
members, and even to influence the priceof their 
shares. Moreover, there is evidence that the ille-
gal operations which led to the penalizing of the 
groups were the result of practices designed to 
transfer the losses to the small shareholders. The 
best-known of these practices consisted in caus-
ing brusque changes in share prices in favour of 
the members of the group, through speculative 
procedures supported by fictitious enterprises. 
It is clear that the groups operate in a typical 
game of large positive elements.2 The expected 
value of the gains is greater than zero, increases 
with the number of activities and constitutes an 
indefinite stimulus to expansion. The only limit-
ing element to their activity is credit and liquidity 
and perhaps the administrative diseconomies 
which result from operating in a large number of 
different activities. 
The expansive capacity of the groups led to 
the assumption that they had and enormous 
potential for making heavy investments of high 
risk. It was not noticed, however, that activities of 
this type were not the most attractive of the fea-
tures and options of the capital market. If the 
profitability of existing firms were greater than 
that of new investments, it was only natural that 
the groups should direct their efforts to obtain-
ing the most benefit from that situation. Hence 
their organizations ended by being particularly 
effective in taking rapid action with a substantial 
supply of liquidity in a large number of activities. 
Their profits derive from activities of speculation 
and transfer rather than from the creation of 
wealth. 
Thus, the groups succeeded in setting up 
organizations which were highly efficient in the 
management of liquidity and in obtaining advan-
tages in a game of large positive elements. It was 
difficult to conceive a framework more pro-
pitious for obtaining advantages from the dis-
tortions and imperfections of the capital market. 
Naturally, the benefits of a structure of this type 
did not stem from the efficiency attributable to 
the virtues of the market. On the contrary, they 
originated in its weaknesses. 
2In all games there are winners and losers. The former 
reflect the positive elements and the latter the negative. In a 
zero sum game, which is usually the case in sports, the positive 
elements equal the negative. The groups participate in a zero 
sum game or in a slightly positive sum game and are highly 
likely to win in numerous activities. Thus, they operate in a 
game in which they obtain large positive elements. 
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5. The heterogeneity of capital markets 
One of the weaknesses of economic theory is its 
assumption that all markets behave in the same 
way as the markets of homogeneous and perish-
able products. The adjustment of these markets 
takes place rapidly, and producers tend to as-# 
sume that the rise in the relative prices of their 
articles is temporary, or at least that the profits 
resulting from storing them are slight. Supplies 
and demands would be in permanent equilib-
rium and expectations would be formed on the 
basis that interest rates tend to remain relatively 
constant. In contrast, because of imperfections 
and the delayed response of supply, asset mar-
kets exhibit slugglish adjustments. Investors, 
knowing that the prices of these goods are ex-
posed to cycles that may last for several years, 
tend to interpret the variations in relative prices 
as a sign of something that will continue to hap-
pen in the future. A speculative demand thus 
arises which helps to amplify these fluctuations. 
Thus the rise in the prices of shares and property 
creates expectations which intensify it. 
This error of appraisal is evident in the usual 
formulations of the financial market. As in the 
case of homogeneous products, it is assumed that 
the market is permanently in equilibrium and 
that the interest rate reflects the scarcity of funds. 
We have seen, however, that assets are highly 
complementary to credit and that the alterations 
in the markets of physical assets are inevitably 
transferred to the financial market. The adjust-
ment problems of one market are manifested in 
the rest. Thus, the tendency of individuals to 
assume that price rises lead to greater increases 
in the future causes an expansion of the demand 
for goods and credit which leads in the end to a 
rise in interest rates. Hence a result is obtained 
which is contrary to the orthodox theory. The 
prices of physical assets and the rate of interest 
move in the same direction. 
The presence of economic groups has also 
helped to change the characteristics of adjust-
ment. These groups operate within a game of 
large positive elements which enable them to with-
stand losses in some activities for certain peri-
ods. Profits are generated over long periods and 
are sometimes realized at the moment of the 
transactions. Consequently, the decisions of the 
groups are not very sensitive to temporary price 
changes and their general attitude is to finance 
temporary losses by the expansion of credit. It 
may be that the rise in the prices of assets and the 
increase in interest rates will end in a greater 
demand for credit. This behaviour has been 
facilitated and intensified by the link between the 
financial institutions and industry. The financ-
ing of enterprises is not subject to the provision 
of guarantees and to bank filters capable of mak-
ing it conditional on a general situation which will 
guarantee the amortization of the debt. The 
groups, on the whole, are ready to carry out these 
operations with their banks as long as the enter-
prises generate income which will enable them to 
maintain their loans indefinitely. 
It is evident that the characteristics of the 
financial institutions and industry. The finan-
cing of enterprises is not subject to the provision 
different from those of the competitive markets 
described in textbooks. In the latter, forces of 
different kinds are assumed to be present which 
tend to regulate and stabilize the market. In con-
trast, the monopoly markets can be exposed to 
permanent pressure, both in periods of expan-
sion and those of contraction, to maintain and 
expand their indebtedness. The demand for cred-
it would be infinite, or at least far greater than 
the supply, and this would lead to high real inter-
est rates and, what is worse, would introduce 
great instability into the system. There is nothing 
to prevent and regularize the increase in the 
prices of assets and interest rates. The process 
may be prolonged and lead to a total collapse of 
the system. 
The infinite demand for credit is a short-
term phenomenon. The rise in the prices of 
assets and interest rates gradually leads to a state 
of insolvency. The power of expansion of the 
groups may prolong the process for several 
years, but it does not prevent collapse, which 
generally results in the failure of the banks and 
industrial firms and in heavy losses for savers. 
Asset prices and interest rates fall abruptly. 
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II 
The Colombi 
The Colombian economy developed during the 
1960s with a highly regulated financial system. 
Credit was directed by the government into 
activities regarded as productive; interest rates 
and the characteristics of securities were fixed by 
the economic authorities; and private external 
indebtedness was limited to certain projects. 
Financial liberalization was based on two types of 
policies. On the one hand, the banks were au-
thorized to negotiate the interest rates on loans 
and to fix the returns and characteristics of 
financial securities. On the other hand, part of 
banks' portfolios was given freedom of action, 
the field for development funds was reduced and 
the mechanisms of bank supervision were 
weakened. 
The liberalization of the Colombian eco-
nomy cannot be compared with that which took 
place in other Latin American countries. For ex-
ample, Argentina and Chile went much further, 
above all in relation to credit. In both countries 
the banks were authorized to distribute their 
portfolio as they chose and the restraints on pro-
curing foreign credit were lifted. In Colombia, in 
contrast, the liberalization of credit was only par-
tial and external credit remained under central 
government control. 
1. The liberalization of credit 
and of financial assets 
Prior to the liberalization, the economy operated 
with a system of regulated interest rates and di-
rected credit. Resources were primarily assigned 
to entrepreneurial investment. Credit for the 
remaining activities, such as durable goods and 
speculative activities, was rationed, and it was 
therefore necessary to pay a higher rate than that 
fixed by the monetary authorities. 
Naturally, the financial liberalization re-
sulted in the movement of funds into restricted 
activities. This process was clearly visible in the 
financing of durable goods, for which there was a 
notable increase in demand. The price of hous-
ing reached record heights and there was a strik-
experience 
1
 ing rise in expenditure on cars and electrical 
household appliances. Moreover, in this latter 
area there was a gradual rise in interest rates, as a 
result of the practice of paying and accepting 
exaggerated interest rates for credit. 
The most interesting case was connected 
with the large enterprises. The traditional con-
straint on the mobilization of credit for the 
acquisition of existing activities together with 
quantity restrictions kept down the price of these 
enterprises for a long time. This behaviour was a 
simple sequel to the complementarity between 
liquidity and the control of large enterprises. 
The liberalization of credit opened the way to 
their purchase at prices below their real value. 
But this option was confined to the groups which 
had access to financial resources and possessed 
the organization necessary for managing the en-
terprises. The practice of acquiring enterprises 
with credit granted to them by financial in-
stitutions appeared attractive and soon became 
widespread. 
This development created a strong link be-
tween industry and the financial sector. The 
groups acquired firms in most cases with credits 
in their favour. The indexes of indebtedness rose 
markedly, their prices went up progressively and 
the financial sector became more vulnerable. 
The figures given in table 4 show the evolu-
tion of share prices before and after the financial 
liberalization. An exact cross-section cannot be 
established because the process was developing 
for several years. Nonetheless, the chief mea-
sures on the subject were adopted during the 
period 1973-1975 and were followed by a time-
lag, which it is not easy to identify, because of a 
marked change in the real prices of shares. These 
increased appreciably between 1976 and 1979. 
The evolution of share prices shows clearly 
that the adjustments were not in accordance with 
the traditional criteria of competition. The dras-
tic fall in prices and the subsequent recovery 
suggest that the enterprises were initially un-
dervalued and later overvalued. This behaviour 
can only be understood in the context of the 
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Table 4 
COLOMBIA: 
INDEX OF REAL PRICES OF SHARES AND HOUSING 



































Source: Share prices (including all shares traded on the 
Bogota Stock Exchange): Bogotá Stock Exchange; housing 
prices: National Centre of Construction Studies (CKNAC); in-
terest rate: Bank of the Republic. 
optimistic expectations which accompanied the 
financial liberalization. 
The rapid rise in the prices of the enterprises 
seemed in some degree to confirm the initial 
assumption that they were undervalued and to 
give grounds for assuming that there would be 
additional increases, which ended in an increas-
ing acceleration of prices. 
No less important was the liberalization of 
financial assets. Sarmiento (1984a, chapter vm) 
shows that in the 1960s financial options in Colom-
bia were limited to the shares of joint-stock com-
panies, the certificates of the Banco Central 
Hipotecario and a few transferable assets, whose 
returns were, in general regulated. The financial 
liberalization modified this structure by au-
thorizing financial intermediaries to issue bonds 
of any type and to be free to fix the returns. Its 
defenders considered that the discretionality of 
the financial intermediaries would be very effi-
ciently regulated by the market, which would 
operate as a filter to select the socially, most ben-
eficial alternatives. In such conditions the re-
turns on bonds would be fixed according to their 
liquidity and the predominant maturity period 
would correspond to that which made the capital 
market most efficient. 
The weakness of these hypotheses lies in 
their disregard for the role of liquidity. In the 
Colombian economy there is ample evidence of 
its importance. The estimates of the elasticity of 
substitution suggest that individuals require an 
enormous reward in order to move from a short-
term asset to one of long duration. Apparently 
the maturity period is not determined by the 
profitability of funds in productive activities but 
by that of those in speculative opportunities. 
The validity of this appraisal is confirmed in the 
light of what took place when the capital market 
was liberalized in Colombia. Sarmiento (1984a, 
chapter vu) shows that the appearance of short-
term bonds created a competition that could not 
be sustained by long-term bonds. Through their 
market preference for liquidity, individuals were 
only ready to maintain long-term bonds with 
enormous differences in interest rates. More-
over, the economic groups did not make much 
effort to avoid this. On the contrary, they fol-
lowed a policy of restricted distribution of profits 
which accelerated the fall in share prices and 
caused the withdrawal of ordinary shareholders. 
The presence of these factors had a marked 
effect on the financial structure of firms. These 
took aggressive action to replace the resources 
obtained through shares with loans from the 
banking system. But this action did not depend 
only on them. The short-term resources supplied 
by savers could not be directly transferred to 
enterprises which need loans of a certain dura-
tion in order to undertake long-term activities. 
The connection had to be made through finan-
cial intermediation. As the banks are open to 
deposits and withdrawals which, by the law of 
probabilities, do not take place simultaneously, 
they are in a position to receive short-term re-
sources and issue them as long-term loans. 
Thanks to this, enterprises have access to loans 
with longer time-periods than deposits and to the 
frequent renewal of their short-term credits. 
The dependence on credit created a power-
ful link between the industrial sector and the 
financial sector. The stability of the enterprises 
remained dependent, to some extent, on the 
willingness of the financial institutions to trans-
form short-term resources into long-term ones. 
Moreover, the shifts of financial assets affected 
the structure of economic power. The control of 
firms is easier when liabilities are represented 
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mainly by credit, because the real assets can be 
obtained with a smaller holding. Credit, then, is 
seen to be a determining factor in the administra-
tive organization of the capital market and ac-
cess to it results in monopoly powers. 
2. The financial-industrial link 
The financial liberalization created opportunities 
of huge profits in the use of credit to acquire 
goods and raised the profitability of the in-
terrelated operations of industry and the finan-
cial sector. These opportunities were confined to 
organizations which had the capacity to manage 
large enterprises or to operate simultaneously 
in several activities. Hence the financial 
liberalization coincided with the strengthening 
and expansion of the economic groups. 
Unfortunately this strengthening originated 
in the main in the monopoly powers obtained 
through access to credit and the advantages 
obtained from the link between industry and the 
Financial sector. The most visible activities of the 
groups were in transfer operations, which re-/ 
quired rapid decisions and liquidity, and in the 
acquisition of existing enterprises. Hence their ex-
pansion was reflected more in the price of the 
enterprises than in the volume of new in-
vestments. Nor did it result in more efficient 
activities. The balance sheets show that the prof-
its of the ten largest enterprises in Colombia de-
clined in the last five years and that several of 
them are now operating at a loss. Something simi-
lar occurred with the financial system. Ortega 
and Hommes (1984) disclosed in a detailed study 
that the profitability of the banks declined bet-
ween 1979 and 1984. The closer linkage between 
the financial system and industrial activities did 
not create more efficient enterprises or financial 
intermediaries. The large profits that it apparen-
tly brought with it were more the result of trans-
fers than of the creation of new wealth. 
The strong link between the enterprises and 
the banks robbed the economic system of room 
for manoeuvre. This was clearly seen in the pe-
riod 1980-1983. The traditional procedure for 
absorbing the losses of enterprises brought on by 
a fall in sales consisted in reducing dividends. 
This adjustment mechanism lost its efficacy 
when the enterprises of the groups became de-
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pendent on credit obtained from their banks, 
and was replaced by the system of simply not 
honouring financial liabilities. The covert form 
of doing this in practice consisted in increasing 
the indebtedness by an amount equal to the inter-
est on the previous debt. Thus the entrepreneu-
rial weakening which took place, instead of 
resulting in a fall in the demand for credit (which 
in the long run would force down interest rates), 
led to increasing indebtedness. 
The most serious result of this structure has 
been instability. On the one hand, the de-
pendence on short-term indebtedness has re-
duced enterprises to a permanent state of in-
solvency, which has interfered with their pro-
gramming and jeopardized the position of the 
banks. The increase in indebtedness coincided 
with a rise in the portfolio ofbad debts which has 
reduced the banks' capacity to take risks. Bank 
failures have increased and the State has had to 
create substantial subsidized credit lines to avoid 
the disappearance of large enterprises. On the 
other hand, the concentration of portfolios in the 
holdings of the groups is contrary to the princi-
ple of diversification of risks and made the econ-
omy more vulnerable. A defect in one small 
part of the structure is enough to cause the fall of 
the group and create chain reactions in economic 
activity. 
It is evident that financial liberalization did 
not stimulate competition among multiple 
economic agents. In practice what was created 
was rather a monopoly competition which did 
not even result in an increase in the number of 
groups, because the bigger the conglomerate, the 
bigger were its opportunities. The larger groups 
proceeded to acquire multiple activities and to 
expand to an extent never before conceived. The 
concentration of ownership was greatly in-
tensified, and just a few conglomerates managed 
to gain control of a large part of the economy. 
3. Interest rates 
One of the most noteworthy aspects of the 
liberalization process was the rise in interest 
rates. It was natural that financial liberalization, 
in making resources accessible to a larger number 
of activities, should provoke an expansion of 
demand for funds and end by raising interest 
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rates. The levels observed in practice, however, 
were much higher than might have been pre-
dicted for systems of perfect competition, and 
real interest rates settled at levels well above the 
estimates of the marginal productivity of capital. 
Nor did the assumption of competitive models 
prove correct, according to which such rates 
could be regulated through te expansion of 
credit. 
The rise in the prices of property caused by 
financial liberalization created an atmosphere of 
optimistic expectations. There was clear 
corroboration of the hypothesis that in these con-
ditions markets fail to behave in accordance with 
the dictates of equilibrium models. For in-
dividuals interpreted the variation in the relative 
prices of property as something that would con-
tinue in the future. A speculative demand for 
goods and credit was generated which drove up 
these prices. Hence the price of shares, the price 
of housing and interest rates all rose during 1975-
1979 (see table 4). 
The assumption that, just as speculation had 
at the outset caused a rise in interest rates, so it 
would finally produce the opposite effect, was 
not borne out. During the financial collapse 
which began between 1980 and 1981 the fall in 
property prices was not accompanied by a drop 
in interest rates. This behaviour may be in-
terpreted in terms of the concepts expounded in 
the first part. At the end of the speculative period 
it is found that the prices of assets have risen to a 
level above normal, and their maintenance at 
that level requires great liquidity on the part of 
the debtors. Indebtedness is incurred to finance 
both past loans and the prevailing interest rates. 
The reluctance to liquidate assets at lower prices 
results in a demand for credit similar to or even 
greater than that observed at the beginning of 
the boom. To put it simply, the credit which 
produced the rise in the prices of existing assets 
turns later into a demand for more credit to 
prevent their fall. Thus, the tendency of real 
interest rates to remain above the marginal pro-
ductivity of capital both in periods of expansion 
and of contraction is a powerful argument in 
favour of the hypothesis that such rates are de-
termined by speculative factors. The demand for 
liquidity results from the efforts both to obtain 
profits and to avoid losses. 
Let us now consider the relationship between 
the high interest rates and the strengthening of 
the financial groups observed during recent 
years. The origin of the two phenomena is sim-
ilar. We have seen that the groups which owned 
banks found that the most profitable option was 
to employ the funds received by the banks to 
acquire existing and related enterprises. At the 
same time, the groups which had no financial 
property moved to obtain bank resources and 
acquire financial institutions. In this process, cred-
it appeared as a central element for the de-
velopment of operations of high profitability. 
The demand for credit increased and put 
pressure on interest rates. We saw above that, as 
long as the stock market was dominated by ordi-
nary shareholders, share prices were very sensitive 
to the interest rate. However, this relationship 
tends to weaken as groups acquire the assets of 
the ordinary shareholders and intensify their 
control over the firms. Decisions cease to be 
sensitive to temporary changes and become more 
dependent on long-term profitability and on the 
monopoly powers of the enterprises. Adjustment 
is not governed by current returns and prices but 
by the play of large positive elements. In these 
conditions, the reduction of the profits of enter-
prises does not lead to a process of liquidation, 
resulting in a reduced demand for credit. Con-
sequently the decisions of the groups in relation 
to credit are not very sensitive to the current inter-
est rate. 
On this point it is not difficult to synthesize 
the effects of the financial changes on interest 
rates. The high levels cannot be attributed mere-
ly to the elimination of administrative restric-
tions. They are mainly explained by the phe-
nomena generated by the liberalization of a mar-
ket exposed to serious rigidities and distortions. 
Credit was mobilized to acquire firms which were 
clearly in a state of disequilibrium, in the sense 
that the limitations imposed by liquidity had 
suited their market values below their real values. 
The greater demand, in conjunction with the 
presence of adaptive expectations in the stock 
markets, provoked a rise in the prices of assets 
which was interpreted as a sign of similar in-
creases in the future, thus causing the demand 
for credit to expand even further and disassociat-
ing access to credit from the situation of the en-
terprises. In this context, interest rates could 
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stand at any level and would not be very sensitive 
to variations in credit. Not even financial col-
lapses succeeded in lowering them to reasonable 
levels. 
4. Efficiency, saving and investment 
The liberalization of the financial sector was jus-
tified in terms of efficiency (McKinnon, 1973). 
On the one hand, it was assumed that high rates 
of interest would cause an increase in saving. On 
the other hand, it was hoped that freedom to 
mobilize funds and interest rates would create a 
favourable framework for directing resources 
into the most profitable activities. It was also 
assumed that the organization of the economic 
groups was very effective for channelling re-
sources into activities of high risk and large scale. 
With this frame of reference it was taken for 
granted that the greater saving resulting from 
the rise in interest rates would be shifted into the 
most productive activities. All this led to predictions 
of an increase in amount and improvement in the 
quality of investment and an acceleration of 
growth. 
The supporters of financial liberalization 
took a very optimistic view of the relationship 
between saving and interest rates. This link has 
been the subject of a long and inconclusive de-
bate, which need not be revived in this article. 
Part of the analytical difficulty lies in the fact that 
the variations in interest rates, since they were 
relatively small in practice, did not have an 
appreciable effect on saving. It was known that a 
change of two points in the interest rate did not 
affect the consumption habits of families, but the 
impact of variations of 6 or 7 percentage points 
was unknow. Thus, the magnitude of the rise in 
interest rates which occurred during the finan-
cial liberalization process provided something 
approaching a laboratory setting for elucidating 
the question. 
Sarmiento (1984a, chap, vn) shows that the 
influence of interest rates on saving in Colombia 
is very slight. The variations in saving are mainly 
explained by the fluctuations of the external sec-
tor and by fiscal policy. Ramos (1984) found a 
similar behaviour pattern in Argentina and 
Chile. Table 5 shows that the rate of saving did 
not increase in theses countries in 1975-1982, when 
interest rates reached their highest levels. 
Table 5 
ARGENTINA, COLOMBIA AND CHILE: 
NATIONAL SAVING AND INTEREST RATES 
Argentina Colombia Chile 
Saving Interest Saving Interest Saving Interest 























































































Source: Saving: ECLAC; Interest rates: Argentina and Chile, J. 
Ramos (1984); Colombia: Bank of the Republic. 
These findings contrast with the trend as 
regards financial securities. In table 6 it will be 
seen that the rise in real interest rates was accom-
panied by an increase in savings deposits. 
Table 6 
COLOMBIA: RATIO BETWEEN FINANCIAL 
SECURITIES AND THE GDP 
v Annual balances Annual increments 
Y e a r
 GDP GDP 
1971 6.5 0.7 
1972 6.4 0.4 
1973 8.7 2.6 
1974 8.8 07 
1975 9.7 1.5 
1976 13.0 3.6 
1977 19.3 2,0 
1978 15.2 1.7 
1979 15.2 0.5 
1980 19.1 4.8 
1981 21.9 4,8 
1982 22.3 0.0 
Source: Bank of the Republic and author's estimates Financial 
securities include all savings deposits and bonds, but not shares. 
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How can this behaviour of time deposits be 
reconciled with that of global siving? The first 
explanation is that part of the increase in time 
deposits originated in shifts from other holdings. 
Thus, in Colombia financial securities displaced 
direct investments in enterprises and securities 
sold in informal markets. Furthermore, much of 
the expansion of financial saving derived from 
the income generated by the high interest rates, 
which constitutes a transfer from the enterprises. 
This outgoing signifies lower share prices or 
smaller profits. 
These adjustments affected the behaviour 
patterns and relationships of the economic 
agents. Heretofore, the decision to acquire 
shares or to engage in direct participation in 
firms virtually implied a like decision to invest, 
and so the profits of the enterprises were largely 
converted into physical capital. Financial 
liberalization, however, in stimulating the more 
to short-term securities, naturally favoured 
financial intermediation, thus weakening the di-
rect link between saving and investment. The 
resources which previously went directly into in-
vestment came to depend on the discretion of the 
financial intermediaries, who in many cases 
found it expedient to divert them into other 
activities. During the financial liberalization 
there was an increase in credit destined for the 
acquisition of durable goods and speculative 
activities such as the purchase of existing enter-
prises. It might be thought, however that since the 
resources employed in these speculative op-
erations, were simple transfers, they need finally 
end up in new activities. This observation would be 
correct if the adjustments occurred in a short space 
of time. But what has happened in practice is that 
the resources pass from one set of speculative 
activities to another, and in this process the interest 
rates remain at high levels which prevent the trans-
fer of resources to productive activities. 
None of this rules out the possibility that the 
rise in interest rates may have helped to increase 
the saving of some economic agents. But this 
increase, assuming that it occurred, was more 
than offset by the shift of credit to consumer 
durables and speculative activities. In reality, the 
effect of the financial reform was not to increase 
saving but to expand financial intermediation. 
The error of interpretation lay precisely in the 
assumption that the two concepts are equivalent. 
The greater scope for mobilizing saving did 
not direct it into productive activities. In the first 
place, it favoured a shift of resources into dura-
ble goods and speculative activities which had 
been restricted by the systems of directed credit. 
Secondly, the greater access to credit did not re-
sult in greater competition among the economic 
agents to mobilize it, but in greater flexibility for 
the economic groups. These employed their 
banks to direct it to the acquisition of enterprises 
whose prices were depressed by the shortage of 
liquidity and to interrelated enterprises which 
enabled them to strengthen their monopoly pow-
ers. Nor was it the case that the groups, because 
they had less fear of taking risks, would un-
dertake large-scale investment. On the contrary, 
they showed a clear preference for activities of 
transfer and speculation. 
Finally, the high interest rates generated by 
the liberalization were not the reflection of the 
high profitability and efficiency of the enter-
prises which obtained the credit. On the contrary, 
they were the result of the marked preference for 
liquidity, for the purpose of obtaining speculative 
gains or preventing losses due to falls in the prices 
of assets. 
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III 
Conclusions 
The theoretical arguments put forward in Part i 
sought to identify certain outstanding features of 
the economic system which differ from the neo-
classical conception of the capitalist market. Some 
of these elements were observed during the 
Financial liberalization process and later during 
the recent crisis. The following section presents a 
summary and practical assessment of their 
general repercussions on the functioning of the 
economy, along with the information which gives 
them empirical support. 
The complementarity between physical 
goods and liquidity runs counter to many sim-
plified versions of the orthodox view. Neoclassic-
al theory is based on the assumption that dif-
ferent goods are highly substitutable. It is con-
sidered that individuals are in a position to obtain 
a certain good in so far as they sacrifice others. In 
the formal conclusions of economic theory it is 
shown that, in such conditions, changes in one 
market affect the others without modifying their 
particular features. Hence there is a tendency to 
treat the processes of supply and demand in the 
capital market and the determination of interest 
rates in isolation from the rest of the economic 
system. This is not so when the goods are com-
plementary, however. In this case, changes in 
one market can destabilize the functioning of 
another which operates satisfactorily when left to 
itself. It is not difficult to show that com-
plementarity between large enterprises and 
liquidity introduces a linkage of similar type. The 
limitations imposed by liquidity are transferred 
to the market of the large entreprises and the 
inelasticity of the latter's supply is passed on to 
the credit market. Both markets tend to operate 
in disequilibrium in the sense that the desired 
demand is greater than the supply. 
The complementarity of liquidity and large 
enterprises is confirmed by factors of various 
types. To begin with, the greater access of in-
dividuals to credit made existing enterprises 
more marketable. The increase in indebtedness 
recorded in the period 1976-1980 coincided with 
a larger number of transactions and a rise in their 
prices. The direct relationship between the 
prices of durable goods and the interest rate is a 
further proof of complementarity. This be-
haviour would not be observed in conditions of 
equilibrium. On the contrary, it is the result of 
si tuations of imbalance created by com-
plementarity, the low supply elasticity of large 
enterprises and of some durable goods, and the 
prevalence of adaptive expectations. 
The presence of economic groups in-
validates the classic hypothesis that the capital 
market is the result of competition between a 
large number of individuals. The action of these 
groups in a game of large positive elements un-
leashes a monopolistic competition to maintain 
and expand credit resources. In addition, the 
traditional role of the banking system in regulat-
ing and rationing out this demand is diminished 
in an interdependent structure of creditors and 
debtors. The financial market is deprived of 
mechanisms to orient the funds, interest rates 
reach excessively high levels, and the system 
tends to be highly unstable. There is nothing to 
prevent an indefinite increase in the prices of 
physical assets and in interest rates. 
The way the groups act in a game of large 
positive elements was clearly corroborated when 
the financial crisis arose. The losses of the banks 
and of the enterprises of the groups were not 
covered by the profits obtained in the past or in 
other activities. The State had to capitalize the 
banking system to compensate for the overdue 
portfolio, which in many cases was made up of 
loans to subsidiary enterprises, and to grant lines 
of credit with subsidized interest rates to in-
dustrial enterprises. At the same, time, small sav-
ers suffered heavy losses through the incapacity 
of the financial institutions to return their de-
posits and through the spectacular fall in the 
prices of shares. There are also indications that 
this game leads to a competition in which not 
many survive. The groups took possession of a 
large part of the economy and the portfolios of 
the financial system were concentrated in a few 
hands. 
There was no corroboration of the general 
assumption that the financial market is stable and 
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achieves gradual adjustment. The rise in the 
prices of shares and durable goods and interest 
rates recorded in the period 1976-1979 suggests 
the contrary. The system can operate in dis-
equilibrium for long periods thanks to the com-
plementarity between credit and physical assets 
and to the inelasticity of the supply of large enter-
prises and of some durable consumer goods. 
Moreover, the system can be highly unstable 
through the presence of monopolies and the pre-
valence of adaptive expectations. 
The facts did not substantiate the hypothesis 
that liberalization of the Financial sector results in 
an expansion of saving and investment which 
subsequently leads to greater economic growth. 
As it was assumed that the administrative regula-
tion of interest rates had depressed saving and 
this had reduced investment, it was regarded as 
certain that the lifting of restraints would radical-
ly modify these conditions. The main error of 
this reasoning lay in assuming a high elasticity 
between saving and the interest rate. Another 
serious error was to imagine that the constraint 
on saving had affected entrepreneurial invest-
ment. In general it was observed that the elimina-
tion of the restriction facilitated the transfer of 
funds to durable consumer goods and specula-
tive activities. 
•Nor is it true that saving is automatically 
channelled into the most efficient investments. 
The characteristics of the financial markets tend 
to stimulate the movement of funds into durable 
consumer goods and the acquisition of existing 
enterprises. The best evidence of this is found in 
the expansion of external saving that occurred in 
the 1960s and 1970s. The inflow of external re-
sources in those years was mainly destined for 
consumption and the financing of physical in-
frastructure (Sarmiento, 1984b, chap. III). 
The simultaneous presence of these ele-
ments gives rise to a financial structure which is 
very different from the traditional concepts. The 
complementarity between large enterprises and 
credit, the activity of the economic groups in a 
game with large positive elements and the pre-
dominance of adaptive expectations create a 
capital market which is highly unstable and un-
able to generate the signals for mobilizing re-
sources into the most appropriate activities. The 
system is exposed to increases in the prices of 
physical assets and in interest rates and to a con-
centration of financial portfolios. Private prof-
itability is not achieved by the more efficient 
conduct of activities but by the exploitation of the 
imperfections of the market and of opportunities 
for speculation. Moreover, the inelasticity of sav-
ing with respect to interest rates, the fact that the 
elasticity of entrepreneurial investment in rela-
tion to interest rates is greater than that of du-
rable consumer goods, and the high profitability 
of existing enterprises all combine to deter the 
preferential movement of funds into productive 
investment. The free movement of funds and the 
high interest rates do not guarantee the most 
efficient allocation of resources, as orthodox 
theory maintains. 
In this context there is an evident need for 
State intervention in order to guarantee the 
stability of the financial market and to mobilize 
resources towards more appropriate activities. 
IV 
Policy repercussions and reforms 
The imperfections of the financial market orig-
inate in the characteristics of the economy and 
in institutional factors. The former are inherent 
in the system and are associated with com-
plementarities, low supply elasticities and the de-
lay in market adjustments. In general, little can 
be done to modify them. In practice, the options 
are reduced to measures designed to moderate 
their undesirable effects. On the other hand, the 
institutional factors, which are particularly re-
lated to the economic groups, offer more room 
for manoeuvre, and several of them are suscept-
ible of being radically changed. 
T h e imbalance created by the com-
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plementarity between liquidity and physical 
assets cannot be corrected by a general expansion 
of credit. As we have seen, this expedient does 
not modify relative prices or the real quantity of 
money, and ultimately it does not alter the effec-
tive demand for durable goods. It is a distortion 
which can only be lessened through State in-
tervention in resource allocation. But this is not 
possible without a strengthening of the tradition-
al mechanisms of directed credit. The systems of 
development credit would have to be improved 
in order to favour the movement of resources 
into new investments. Moreover, bank loans 
would have to be subject to strict control and 
supervision to prevent their diversion into the 
purchase of existing properties or the acquisition 
of durable consumer goods. 
We cannot ignore the institutional difficul-
ties of carrying out a policy of this type. It is 
possible that the instruments will be used in 
accordance with the political priorities of each 
government or in response to the pressures of 
the economic groups. For this very reason the 
viability and desirability of a system of directed 
credit are dependent on the existence of de-
velopment banks which maintain some degree of 
continuity and are not subject to political con-
ditions and pressures. This is by no means an 
impossible proposal, however. There are several 
examples of institutions which have succeeded in 
liberating their activities from political con-
siderations. A good example is found in the 
activities of the energy and mining sector in Col-
ombia, where there has been marked continuity 
during the last ten years without much political 
interference. There are also more general ex-
amples. Thus, the development banking system 
in Mexico has achieved suitable orientation of 
resources by adhering to relatively stable pro-
grammes established in the development plans. 
Perhaps the first step in obtaining an auton-
omous credit structure would be to establish a 
general body responsible for the mobilization of 
development funds and to give it a series of 
specific functions which would limit the 
possibilities of political or group pressure. It is 
not the purpose of this paper to analyse the in-
stitutional framework required for the function-
ing of such a body. It may be assumed, however, 
that it would not be very different from certain 
bodies which, through boards composed of offi-
cials of the Executive and independent experts, 
have achieved some autonomy in the per-
formance of their functions. 
State intervention should also be extended to 
interest rates. Experience shows that high inter-
est rates do not materially alter saving, but they 
do discourage investment and raise the op-
erational costs of enterprises. Naturally, market 
solutions have little chance of orienting a variable 
determined by economic distortions and specula-
tive conditions. The effective control of interest 
rates calls for the application of administrative 
mechanisms. The experience of the 1960s, 
however, shows that negative interest rates cre-
ated enormous deviations of loans and stimu-
lated a demand for credit which seriously ham-
pered the control of the money supply. The 
maintenance of this structure seems much more 
difficult in the present conditions of openness of 
the world economy and with the returns prevail-
ing in external markets. In these conditions, the 
interest rates must be positive, but not by more 
than one or two points. 
There should be a change in the conditions 
which give advantages and monopoly powers to 
the groups. The privilege of administering pub-
lic goods should be eliminated. A clear definition 
is needed of the activities which ultimately re-
quire State invervention, and they should be sub-
ject to a treatment similar to that envisaged in 
bank legislation. The State should have the facul-
ty to intervene in these activities when it consid-
ers that they are being administered in a way 
which does not benefit society or the sharehold-
ers. 
The composition and organization of the 
groups should also be a matter for open decision. 
Recent experience shows that the existing legisla-
tion has facilitated their expansion by ignoring 
them. The correct course would rather be to 
define a series of presumptions and conditions 
which would force the groups to reveal them-
selves as such and to respond in a solidary man-
ner with regard to the different activities admin-
istered and controlled by them. In this way the 
losses suffered in some activities would have to be 
covered by profits obtained in others. The game 
of large positive elements would thus become a 
fairer type of competition. 
The regulation of associations among 
economic agents is the field which calls for the 
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most innovative reforms. The development and 
consolidation of economic groups originated in 
the desire of governments to facilitate the es-
tablishment of organizations capable of un-
dertaking projects of high risk and large size, 
which has been one of the most serious con-
straints on economic growth. The link between 
the financial and industrial sectors, however, re-
sulted in organizations which were very skilful in 
speculative operations. Their prohibition would 
not prejudice the capacity of the economy to 
undertake large investment projects. On the con-
trary, it would stimulate the creation of self-
sufficient organizations with a greater capacity 
for devoting themselves exclusively to pro-
ductive activities. It would be a decisive step to-
wards achieving the development of a stable 
financial sector that would favour investment. 
We cannot overlook the fact that the enter-
prises succeeded in replacing the long-term 
financing of shares by short-term credit thanks to 
their control of the banks. If that link dis-
appeared, the enterprises would not have the 
same guarantees for prolonging short-term 
loans. They would find themselves under pres-
sure to follow a realistic policy of dividends in 
order to attract small shareholders and thus 
achieve a better structure of liabilities. The de-
velopment of the stock market would be facili-
tated by a structure in which the two sectors are 
independent. The same would also occur in the 
opposite sense; the formation of an independent 
s t ructure would be facilitated within the 
framework of an advanced stock market. 
The feasibility of a structure in which the 
financial and industrial sectors are independent 
is conditional, therefore, on the formation of a 
capital market based on securities with a longer 
period of maturation. The issue of securities can-
not be left to the entire discretion of the financial 
institutions. Some administrative and economic 
action is required to encourage them to offer 
bonds with longer maturation periods. Moreov-
er, it is essential to reorganize the stock market. 
Dividend policy should be regulated and super-
vised so that the dividends reflect the real situa-
tion of the enterprises. Taxes which discriminate 
against shares should be eliminated and perhaps 
replaced by incentives. The necessary in-
stitutional conditions should be created for the 
development of secondary markets. 
The desirability of associations in the finan-
cial sector is much less clear. Experience shows 
that thanks to these some entities were acquired 
with loans granted by others, ending in a crossed 
and highly concentrated system that enabled the 
limits on capitalization to be evaded. The solu-
tion, however, does not lie in a structure based on 
totally independent institutions. The universal 
trend is in the direction of the joint supply of 
bank services, and in some studies it is indicated 
that this has brought with it appreciable econom-
ies of scale (Bernai and Herrera, 1983). The most 
practical solution would be rather to establish 
norms setting out the solidarity between dif-
ferent institutions and prohibiting the granting 
of credit to acquire the properties of the group. 
This measure would eliminate the factors of in-
stability, while preserving the advantages of the 
provision of bank services on a large scale. 
The linkages in the industrial sector are 
largely determined by natural reasons. The 
dynamics of industrialization generate processes 
of learning and experience which can be ex-
ploited by investments in allied activities. Any 
attempt to interfere in this natural process would 
delay the possibilities of technological diffusion 
and transfer. Even so, the practice of acquiring 
activities simultaneously in the industrial sector 
cannot be left to the discretion of the private 
sector. As in the financial sector, these associa-
tions must be declared and must involve legal 
solidarity. Moreover, they should only be au-
thorized in those cases that are clearly desirable 
for society as a whole and they should be subject 
to strict supervision to prevent their use for 
monopoly purposes. 
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Appendix 
The expected profitability of shares 
The profitability of a share is equal to the div-
idends paid, plus the real appreciation of the 
price. This appreciation is unknown and in-
troduces great uncertainty into the market. The 
means employed by individuals to infer it can be 
analysed with the help of elementary mathema-
tics. 
The profitability expected by individuals is 
equal, as we said, to the dividends plus the antic-
ipated appreciation: 
Pa * 
- J L ) 
Pa P ; 
Where D = dividend, Pa = price of the share, P = 
level of prices, Pa _ percentage of price varia-
tion, and -£- = variation of the level of prices. 
Let us suppose that the interest rate on fixed-
income bonds, adjusted for risk, is r. In con-
ditions of equilibrium this would be expressed as 
follows: 
r = - D _ + Ía_-± 
Pa Pa P 
If the term on the left is greater than that on 
the right, individuals would sell their shares, thus 
provoking a fall in their real prices. If, on the 
other hand, it is less, the prices of the shares will 
rise. The alteration in the price of the shares will 
in its turn alter the dividend and the expectations 
of appreciation. Each variable will be cause and 
effect of the rest. 
This process can be simplified by the in-
troduction of some practical elements. Let us 
suppose that the share market is operating in 
conditions of equilibrium with a given dividend. 
If this dividend increases less than inflation, the 
return will tend to fall in the following period. If 
the conditions and possibilities of investment in 
other options do not vary, the individuals will try 
to sell their shares until their real depreciation is 
equal to that of the dividend. 
This interpretation of the behaviour of the 
market is relatively simple and is known by most 
of the agents operating in the stock exchange. It 
is, in fact, possible to assume that individuals 
formulate their forecasts on the assumption that 
the depreciation of returns is accompanied by an 
equal depreciation of the price. In algebraical 
terms: 
pa
 - R 
D Pa 
In equilibrium the following approximation 
would occur: 
r = ^ - + D _ JP 
Pa D P 
The term on the right of this expression can 
be calculated on the basis of historical figures of 
returns and inflation. 
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